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LAW CLERK INFLUENCE ON SUPREME
COURT DECISION MAKING:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
Todd C. Peppers* and Christopher Zorn**
INTRODUCTION
In the past ten years, U.S. Supreme Court law clerks have achieved
a visibility unmatched in Supreme Court history. A former Blackmun
clerk wrote a tell-all tale of law clerk mischief at the Supreme Court,'
a series of articles in USA Today addressing the lack of law clerk di-
versity sparked protests and the grilling of Supreme Court Justices by
congressional subcommittees, 2 former clerks offered insight into the
turmoil gripping the Court during the 2000 presidential election,3 and
two new television series focused on the behind-the-scenes machina-
tions of Supreme Court clerks.4 The decade of the law clerk
culminated in the publication of two major academic works on Su-
preme Court law clerks.5 Both books sought to provide a thorough
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Roanoke College; Lecturer in Law, Washington
and Lee School of Law.
** Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. A previous version of this
paper was presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
August 31 to September 3, 2006, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Our thanks to Greg Caldeira, Scott
Comparato, William Henderson, and seminar participants at the Indiana University Law School,
the University of Georgia, and the Ohio State University for helpful comments and suggestions.
All remaining errors are our own.
1. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE
Epic STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998).
2. See Tony Mauro, Corps of Clerks Lacking in Diversity, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1998, at 12A.
3. See David Margolick et al., The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2004, at 310-20.
4. The television shows-both of which were quickly cancelled-were "First Monday," star-
ring James Garner and Joe Mantegna, and "The Court," starring Sally Field, Pat Hingle, and
Diahann Carroll.
5. See TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE
OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SOR-
CERER'S APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
(2006). The two books immediately spawned discussion in the media, law reviews, and scholarly
journals. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon & Dahlia Lithwick, Endangered Species: In Defense of the
Supreme Court Law Clerks, SLATE, June 13, 2006, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2143628
(book review); Jeff Bleich, Book Review, CAL. LAWYER, Jan. 2007, at 34: Deborah Challenger,
Book Review, 16 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 693 (2006); Paul M. Collins. Jr.. Book Review, 29
JUST. SYs. J. 117 (2008); David J. Garrow, Acolytes in Arms, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 411 (2006) (book
review); Harvey Gee, Book Review, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 781 (2008): Charles Lane, The Varying
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analysis of the rules and norms surrounding the hiring and utilization
of law clerks and to address the one question deemed most salient by
Court scholars: whether law clerks wielded inappropriate influence
over judicial decision making.6
Ironically, the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist first suggested
that law clerks might be unduly influencing their Justices. 7 In 1957,
the young Rehnquist suggested that both shoddy legal research as well
as the "unconscious slanting" of certiorari (cert) memoranda by law
clerks might affect how the Justices voted on cert petitions. 8 Given
Rehnquist's assertion that the majority of law clerks were liberal and
the Justices conservative, his basic concern was that the cert memo-
randa were causing the Justices to vote in a manner more consistent
with the law clerks' liberal political agenda. 9
Rehnquist's article sent tremors throughout the small community of
former law clerks, and several rushed to refute his claims.10 The pro-
verbial genie, however, was out of the bottle, and that initial article
has spawned scores of books and articles discussing and debating the
question of law clerk influence.1' While some former law clerks mod-
estly claim that their Justice really didn't need his or her law clerks
and simply humored the clerks by soliciting their advice and counsel,
Influence of Clerks, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2006, at A13 (book review); Wendy L. Martinek, Book
Review, 16 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 769 (2006); David C. Mizer, 2007 Survey of Books Related
to the Law: Supreme Court Clerks: The Bureaucratic Court, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1301 (2007);
Richard A. Posner, The Courthouse Mice, NEW REPUBLIC, June 12, 2006, at 32 (book review);
Peter B. Rutledge, Clerks, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 369 (2007) (book review); Dan Slater, The Clerk
Conundrum, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2006, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114899525276
566278.html (book review); D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Judicial Bookshelf, 32 J. SuP. CT.
HIST. 190 (2007) (book review); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of
Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEx. L. REV. 947 (2007) (book review); Rick A. Swan-
son, How Much Influence?, JUDICATURE, Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 137 (book review): Artemus Ward,
Book Review, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 340 (2008).
6. See PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 2 ("Enduring intrigue and interest about Supreme Court law
clerks has stemmed primarily from one central debate-do law clerks wield an inappropriate
amount of influence over their justices?").
7. See William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1957, at 74.
8. See id.
9. See id.; see also William H. Rehnquist, Another View: Clerks Might "Influence" Some Ac-
tions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 21, 1958, at 116.
10. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Court: An Indictment Analyzed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1958,
at M16; William D. Rogers, Clerks' Work is "Not Decisive of Ultimate Result," U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 21, 1958, at 114.
11. See generally LAZARUS, supra note 1; BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979); David J. Garrow, The Brains Behind Black-
mun, LEGAL AnT., May-June 2005, at 26.
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other former clerks and Court insiders recount stories of ambitious
clerks manipulating their malleable employers. 12
Admittedly, these latter stories make for compelling reading. To
date, however, the question of law clerk influence has not been ex-
amined empirically. While social scientists have carefully tested myr-
iad models of Supreme Court decision making,13 they have yet to
consider the influence of law clerks' policy preferences on Court deci-
sions. The origins of this failure are twofold: first, researchers have
not fully appreciated law clerks' extensive job responsibilities, and,
therefore, the potential for them to influence the Justices; second, re-
searchers have simply not collected data on law clerks in general-and
on their policy preferences in particular.
Here, we undertake the first effort at assessing the existence and
extent of law clerk influence in the U.S. Supreme Court. Drawing
upon original survey data on the political ideology of 532 former law
clerks, we evaluate the extent to which both the Justice's personal pol-
icy preferences and those of his or her law clerks exert an independent
influence on the Justice's votes. While our results are preliminary,
they nonetheless support the contention that-over and above "selec-
tion effects" due to Justices choosing like-minded clerks-clerks' ide-
ological predilections exert an additional, and not insubstantial,
influence on the Justices' decisions on the merits. In Part II, we first
present a short overview of the evolution of the rules and norms sur-
rounding the hiring and utilization of law clerks at the United States
Supreme Court, paying special attention to the job duties of clerks on
the current Supreme Court. 14 Drawing upon principal-agent theory,
in Section II.B, we then discuss the dynamics between law clerks and
Justices and the conditions that must be present before law clerks can
wield influence.' 5 Finally, in Parts III, IV, and V, we propose and
empirically test a model of Supreme Court decision making that in-
cludes the preferences of law clerks as a separate independent
variable. 16
12. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 262-75, 314-22, 391-94.
13. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATri-
TUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (outlining the "attitudinal" model of Supreme Court deci-
sion making), LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (discussing
the "strategic" model).
14. See infra notes 17-44 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 55-95 and accompanying text.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK: A BRIEF HISTORY 17
The history of the Supreme Court law clerk begins in 1882, when
Justice Horace Gray selected Harvard Law School graduate Thomas
Russell to work as his legal secretary. 18 Initially, Gray personally paid
his secretaries.19 In return, Gray called upon his young charges to
help with legal research and opinion writing.20 Justice Gray's motiva-
tion for hiring a legal assistant was likely a product of his work habits;
one of Gray's former legal secretaries wrote that he "liked historical
research, and, until he knew everything that history could tell him, he
was unwilling to decide a case. He had both the thoroughness and the
accuracy of the scholar." '21
In 1886, Congress authorized funds for each Justice to hire a steno-
graphic clerk.22 While most Justices subsequently hired assistants-
either older attorneys or professional stenographers-to take dicta-
tion and assist in mundane duties, over the next two decades Justice
John Marshall Harlan I and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. fol-
lowed Gray's lead and hired newly graduated law students to assist
with more substantive tasks.23 Each clerk's tenure varied by Justice
and usually turned on how the Justice used the clerk. Justices who
hired newly graduated law students for substantive legal work tended
to rotate their clerks on a yearly basis, while those Justices who em-
ployed older attorneys or non-attorneys for clerical assistance re-
tained their clerks for longer periods.24
A critical development in the evolution of the clerkship institution
came in 1919, when Congress authorized the Justices to hire both a
law clerk and a stenographer. 25 While not all Justices immediately
took advantage of this new authorization by hiring a second assistant,
the Justices now had the resources to hire one staff member for purely
17. Much of the following relies on PEPPERS, supra note 5. For further discussion of the early
years of law clerks at the Supreme Court, see generally WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 5: Chester
A. Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 299
(1961).
18. Newland, supra note 17, at 301. For more information about Justice Gray, see generally
Elbridge B. Davis & Harold A. Davis, Mr. Justice Horace Gray: Some Aspects of His Judicial
Career, 41 A.B.A. J. 421 (1955).
19. Samuel Williston, Horace Gray, in GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS: A HISTORY OF THE LE-
GAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 157-58 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1909).
20. See id. at 158-60.
21. Francis C. Lowell, Horace Gray, 39 PROC. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 630 (1904).
22. Act of Aug. 4, 1886, ch. 902, 24 Stat. 222, 254.
23. PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 53-54, 56-60.
24. See generally id. at 38-82.
25. Act of May 29, 1920, ch. 214, 41 Stat. 631, 686-87.
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secretarial support and a second for more substantive legal duties. 26
As with most Washington bureaucracies, the clerkship institution con-
tinued to grow: by the middle of the twentieth century, the Justices
could hire two law clerks, a secretary, and a messenger.27 Today, each
Justice may hire up to four law clerks, while the Chief Justice may
employ five law clerks, plus two administrative assistants.28 As estab-
lished practice, law clerks work for a single term of Court, although
some Justices prefer to have a senior clerk who serves a second term
and brings continuity to the chambers.29 Almost all modern law
clerks are recent law school graduates. 30
A clerkship on the Supreme Court has become a highly sought prize
for graduating law students. This ultimate brass ring, however, is
available to only a select few. A comprehensive picture of the law
clerk corps reveals that almost all law clerks are white, graduates of
elite colleges and law schools, former members of law reviews, and
former clerks for federal appeals court "feeder" judges.31 While Jus-
tice William 0. Douglas hired the first female law clerk, Lucile
Lomen, in 1944, the Justices did not begin to hire significant numbers
of female clerks until the 1980s.32 Today, following a highly prized
Supreme Court clerkship, law clerks can virtually dictate their own
career path. For instance, clerks can work at the Department of Jus-
tice, teach at top law schools, or reap signing bonuses of up to
$200,000 by joining prestigious law firms in New York, Washington,
D.C., and Los Angeles. 33
A. Law Clerk Responsibilities and the Question of Influence
Any discussion of law clerk influence must necessarily begin with a
thorough understanding of the duties assigned to clerks. The func-
tions of Supreme Court clerks have varied widely over the history of
the clerkship institution.34 In the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, Justices such as Pierce Butler, Benjamin Cardozo, Charles Evans
26. PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 83.
27. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 5, at 22-23, 36-37.
28. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 132
(7th ed. 2003); PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 176; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 5, at 22-23, 45.
29. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 5, at 46-48.
30. Id. at 54-68.
31. PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 20-36.
32. Id. at 21.
33. See Charles Lane, Former Clerks' Signing Bonuses Rival Salaries on the High Court,
WASH. POST, May 15, 2006, at A15; David Lat, The Supreme Court's Bonus Babies, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2007, at A19. See generally PEPPERS, supra note 5.
34. See generally PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 38-205 (describing the evolving role of the Su-
preme Court law clerk).
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Hughes, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and William Howard Taft rou-
tinely assigned their law clerks the task of reviewing petitions for cer-
tiorari.35 The limited historical evidence suggests, however, that no
Justice relinquished the role of opinion writer during this time pe-
riod.36 By the 1940s and 1950s, Justices Sherman Minton, Frank Mur-
phy, and Fred Vinson began to break with historical practice and
require their law clerks to both review cert petitions and draft opin-
ions.37 Still, other Justices, such as Harlan Fiske Stone, Harold Bur-
ton, and Robert Jackson, maintained the practice of drafting their own
opinions.38
In the last thirty years, nearly all the Justices have broadened the
clerks' duties. The clerks now review cert petitions, write memoranda
summarizing the petitions, and recommend whether to grant or deny
review; write bench memoranda that prepare the Justices for oral ar-
gument; and prepare the first drafts of majority, concurring, and dis-
senting opinions.39 With these responsibilities, clerks have multiple
opportunities to exercise influence over how the Justice votes in a
given case.
A summary of law clerk duties for modern Justices (excluding those
Justices who sat on the Rehnquist Court on or after 2004) is presented
in Table 1. All modern Justices seek verbal or written input and gui-
dance from their clerks in reviewing cert petitions and preparing for
oral argument. 40 At the same time, those Justices vary widely in the
degree of additional responsibility they delegate to their law clerks;
moreover, minor variations exist across chambers in the details of how
cert and bench memoranda are prepared. 41
The extent and nature of Supreme Court clerks' formal responsibili-
ties is directly relevant to the question of their possible influence. If a
clerk's duties are limited to taking dictation or proofreading opinions
for grammatical errors, then substantive influence is effectively impos-
sible. Such a clerk may, at most, influence the style of the opinion, but
35. Id. at 57-58, 67-68, 85-86, 93-96.
36. See generally id. at 38-144.
37. Id. at 109-12, 134-39, 141-42.
38. Id. at 88-93, 125-29, 131-33.
39. Of all the Justices on the Rehnquist Court, only Justice John Paul Stevens prepared his
own opinion drafts. To date, there is no evidence suggesting that either Chief Justice John Rob-
erts or Associate Justice Samuel Alito have deviated from the now-standard practice of having
clerks prepare first drafts of opinions.
40. See generally PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 145-205.
41. See generally id.
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not its content; thus, the clerk's own preferences will be immaterial to
the Justice's decision. At the other extreme is a Justice who allows his
or her clerks wide latitude in authoring opinion drafts, such that the
clerk effectively determines the winners and losers in cases pending
before the Court. In this scenario, the Justice has effectively abdi-
cated the role of decisionmaker, and the influence of the clerk's own
preferences and goals on the Justice's actions is at its apex.4 3
Influence, however, can also be more benign. For example, a Jus-
tice may change his or her vote because a clerk has discovered a dis-
positive fact in the record or convincingly argued that a controlling
precedent is distinguishable. In both situations, the Justice has
changed his or her vote while retaining the role of decisionmaker. Al-
ternatively, a law clerk's policy arguments might sway a Justice. Dur-
ing the initial review of the cert petition, in a bench memorandum,
during informal conversation, or as the opinion is drafted, the clerk
could convince the Justice that a specific holding represents the ideal
political outcome. Finally, a Justice may determine who prevails in a
42. Id. at 143. 190.
43. The authors know of no evidence of such a remarkable abdication of power ever occurring
in the Court's history, although the late-career infirmity and illness of such Justices as Charles
Whittaker, John Harlan II, William O. Douglas, and Thurgood Marshall have raised concerns
about whether the institutional conditions existed for law clerk misadventure. See generally
























case while relying upon the clerk to find a legal doctrine or precedent
to support the Justice's preferred outcome.44
B. The Principal-Agent Theory of Supreme Court Clerks
Recently, scholars have turned to principal-agent theory as a tool
for understanding the dynamics of law clerks and Justices. 45  Paul
Wahlbeck and others characterize the relationship between Justices
and their clerks as "a classic principal-agent relationship," noting that:
Justices, as principals, hire agents, their clerks, to perform particular
tasks, such as writing first drafts of opinions. The clerks, however,
often gain informational advantages over the justices regarding vari-
ous aspects of cases .... What is more, as clerks research the facts
and law relevant for a case, they can develop private information
that would allow them to steer decisions in a particular direction.
Consequently, it is possible that they can introduce language or de-
velop legal reasoning that is not entirely consistent with the justices'
positions, and the justice may be uncertain about whether the clerks
are making choices that will produce outcomes desirable to them. 46
As in all principal-agent relationships, the Justices, as principals,
must solve two different dilemmas in employing law clerks as agents:
adverse selection and moral hazard.47 The law clerk, not the Justice,
44. Of course, the potential for law clerk influence extends well beyond voting on the merits
of the case and opinion writing. All law clerks prepare cert memoranda, and a clerk who seeks a
specific outcome might misrepresent facts in the record, minimize the appearance of a split
among the circuits, or make a compelling policy argument as to why a case should not be heard.
Moreover, at least in recent years, the Justices are clearly aware of the potential for clerks to
influence the Court's agenda-setting process. For example, Linda Greenhouse noted a 1996
memo to the clerks from Chief Justice Rehnquist, in which he expressed
his displeasure at learning that law clerks were not honoring the supposedly random
assignment of cert petitions to the so-called "cert pool. The practice of random-
ness was supposed to avoid having ideologically charged cases fall regularly into the
hands of law clerks or chambers with an ideological stake in the outcome.
Linda Greenhouse, How Not To Be Chief Justice: The Apprenticeship of William H. Rehnquist,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1369-70 (2006).
45. See generally PEPPERS, supra note 5; Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Selection of Law
Clerks and Polarization in the U.S. Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869 (2001); Sally Kenney, Beyond
Principals and Agents: Seeing Courts as Organizations by Comparing Referendaires at the Euro-
pean Court of Justice and Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 593
(2000).
46. Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., Ghostwriters on the Court?: A Stylistic Analysis of U.S. Supreme
Court Opinion Drafts, 30 AM. POL. RES. 166, 173 (2002).
47. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Be-
tween Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345 (1982); Jonathan R.
Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315 (1991);
Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 203
(2005); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization. 28 AM. J. POL. Sci. 739 (1984); Alan
0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984).
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possesses the most complete information regarding the clerk's skill
set, and it is not in the clerk's best interests to present anything but an
exaggerated picture of his or her abilities. More important, even the
most qualified candidates will bring to the position their own set of
policy goals and preferences. As Moe notes, "[T]here is no guarantee
that the agent .. .will in fact choose to pursue the principal's best
interests or to do so efficiently. The agent has his own interests at
heart. 48 Thus the Justice must be vigilant in monitoring the law clerk
for both incompetence and subterfuge while simultaneously adopting
institutional rules and incentives-both positive and punitive-that
will encourage clerks to carry out their duties in a manner consistent
with the Justices' wishes. 49
As noted above, in the early decades of the clerkship institution, the
duties assigned to law clerks were mundane, and the risk that a law
clerk would defect was correspondingly minimal. 50 Modern Supreme
Court Justices, however, grant significant job responsibilities to their
clerks; thus, the defection of a law clerk could have far-reaching con-
sequences. In light of these responsibilities, it is in the Justices' best
interest to fashion rules and norms "that, in mitigating the informa-
tional asymmetries and structuring rewards, prompt[ ] the agent to be-
have as the principal himself would under whatever conditions might
prevail." 51
Contemporary Supreme Court Justices use a variety of tools by
which they can reduce the possibility of defection. The most powerful
of these is selection: the Justices typically choose new clerks each
term and almost always personally interview finalists for the posi-
tions.52 Moreover, consistent with the greater levels of delegation in
the modern Court era, Ditslear and Baum find clear evidence that,
particularly in the past two decades, Justices endeavor to select clerks
that share the Justices' ideological preferences. 53
The principal-agent perspective thus suggests a number of implica-
tions about the possibility of clerk influence. First, the substantial de-
gree of delegation of responsibility to clerks in the modern Court era
48. Moe, supra note 47, at 756.
49. See John E. Chubb, The Political Economy of Federalism, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 994,
994-1014 (1985); David E. M. Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 45, 45-66 (1991).
50. See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
51. Moe, supra note 47, at 756-57.
52. Beyond selection, recent Justices have fashioned monitoring devices and increased the
penalties for defection with the adoption of a formal law clerk code of conduct. See PEPPERS,
supra note 5, at 203-05.
53. See Ditslear & Baum, supra note 45, at 870-75.
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suggests that, minimally, the necessary preconditions for influence are
met. We, therefore, have at least some reason to believe that, at the
margin, clerks may be capable of shaping the Court's decisions. The
advent of mechanisms to deal with the possibility of clerk defection,
however, tempers this expectation somewhat. In particular, following
Ditslear and Baum,54 we expect that Justices will seek out ideologi-
cally compatible clerks, and, as a result, mitigate clerk influence.
III. MEASURING LAW CLERK POLICY PREFERENCES
Assessing whether clerks' policy preferences influence the Court's
decision making requires first that we develop a measure of those
preferences. Between 1882 and 2004, approximately 1800 men and
women clerked on the United States Supreme Court.55 We obtained
the names of those clerks from the Supreme Court Public Information
Office and used a range of sources to code personal and demographic
data on them. We also collected mailing addresses for approximately
1000 of the 1600 clerks who served in the Supreme Court between
1940 and 2004. These former clerks were then mailed a one-page sur-
vey, which included questions concerning the clerk's law school activi-
ties, lower court clerkship, and subsequent professional activities. The
survey also contained the following closed-end question: "During
your clerkship on the United States Supreme Court, which political
party more closely mirrored your own personal political ideology?"
Respondents were limited to checking a box next to "Democratic
Party" or "Republican Party."
This last question was designed to gather data on the respondents'
political preferences at the time of their clerkship. While recognizing
that political party is an imperfect proxy measure of political ideology,
alternative words like "liberal" or "conservative" could be open to
multiple interpretations and would also be likely to suppress survey
response rates.5 6 Of the 639 former clerks who responded to our sur-
vey, 135 answered that the Republican Party more closely mirrored
their political ideology at the time of their clerkship, and 397 an-
swered that the Democratic Party more closely mirrored their political
ideology.57
54. See id.
55. PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 20.
56. For similar reasons, we did not provide respondents the third choice of "independent" out
of concern that former clerks would select that alternative to avoid revealing their true
partisanship.
57. An additional ninety-nine respondents did not answer the question, and eight respondents
wrote in "Independent" despite not being given that choice.
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Our data paint a rich portrait of changes in the clerkship institution.
Figure 1 presents an overview of these data, plotting the percentage of
clerks serving in each term that (1) were female, (2) had served previ-
ously as a clerk in a lower federal court, (3) were drawn from the
"top-five" law schools from which clerks have historically graduated
(Harvard University, Yale University, Columbia University, the Uni-
versity of Chicago, and Stanford University), and (4) indicated that
they were closer, ideologically, to the Republican Party.5
8




SUPREME COURT CLERK CHARACTERISTICS,
1953-2004 TERMS 59
I I I
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Term
.... Percentage Female Percentage Lower Court Clerks
......... Percentage From Top-5 Law School - - Percentage GOP (predicted)
The two most striking trends in Figure 1,are those for gender and
for the use of "feeder" judges. While women held essentially none of
the clerkships in the 1950s and early 1960s, their numbers have risen
steadily since that time, to a high of more than forty-one percent in
2001. Even more substantial is the increase in the numbers of clerks
with prior clerkship experience in the lower federal courts, which went
from being the exception during the 1950s to a de facto requirement
58. Note that this last variable is a combination of survey responses and predicted values; see
infra note 60 and accompanying text for more details on the construction of this measure.





for a Supreme Court clerkship in the last twenty years. In contrast to
these trends, the percentages for both "top-five" law school graduates
and self-identified Republicans among Supreme Court clerks have
been relatively stable over the past five decades.
We draw on these data to develop our measure of the political pref-
erences of the men and women who served as clerks on the U.S. Su-
preme Court. As noted above, we begin with data on 532 former
clerks who indicated their partisan affiliation on our survey.
A. Measuring Non-Responsive Clerks
While these data are a valuable resource, it is important to also note
that a substantial number of respondents refused to answer the ques-
tion about political preferences, and an even larger number did not
respond to the survey at all. Ideally, we could use the information
contained in the survey responses to infer the partisan affiliations of
those clerks who did not respond. To do so, however, requires that we
assess the extent to which survey respondents and non-respondents
differ: if those clerks responding to our survey were systematically
different from those that did not, then using the respondents' data to
predict the partisanship of non-respondents would yield biased
predictions.
Accordingly, we adopt a two-pronged strategy. First, we estimate a
combined model of survey response and clerk partisanship in which
we account for the possibility of selection effects due to survey non-
response. Doing so allows us to assess whether survey non-response
might bias our estimates of partisanship, as well as to examine empiri-
cally one of the central implications of our principal-agent perspec-
tive: the extent to which Justices choose ideologically like-minded
clerks. Second, we draw on our findings from that model to create
aggregate measures of clerk partisanship for each Justice's chambers
in each term, and use that measure to assess the question of clerk
influence in a model of Supreme Court decision making.
For our initial analysis, the variables of interest are the survey re-
sponse, coded one for those clerks responding to our survey and zero
for those that did not, and clerk partisanship, in which the response of
interest is coded one if the clerk identified as Republican and zero for
Democratic identifiers. Note that the latter model can be estimated
only for those clerks for whom partisanship data are available. To
address the possibility of selection bias due to survey non-response,
we estimate a bivariate probit model with sample selection. 60 This ap-
60. WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 849-55 (4th ed. 2000).
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proach allows us to test for the presence of sample selection bias for-
mally via a test of P = 0 (where p is the implicit correlation between
the errors in the selection and partisanship equations) and thus to as-
sess the extent to which survey non-response biases our predictions of
non-responding clerks' political partisanship.
B. Judicial Ideology of Entering Supreme Court Clerks
What factors determine the ideology of those chosen to serve as
Supreme Court clerks? From our perspective rooted in principal-
agent theory, the Justices should possess strong incentives to ensure
that clerks share their overall legal and policy perspectives. 61 Moreo-
ver, Ditslear and Baum's analysis is strongly consistent with this per-
spective, although their evidence on this point is indirect.62
Accordingly, we expect that, when all else is equal, more ideologically
liberal Justices will be more likely to select clerks whose political party
affiliation is Democratic, while more conservative Justices will be
more likely to choose Republican clerks.
We measure Justice Liberalism using the familiar Segal-Cover
scores, 63 rescaled to range from zero (most conservative) to one (most
liberal). Figure 2 plots the percentage of each Justice's clerks in our
data who indicate that they identify with the Republican Party. Sym-
bol sizes are proportional to the number of clerks on which the per-
centage is based and range from a low of one clerk (for Justices
Fortas, Goldberg, and Jackson) to a high of forty-five (for Justice
Brennan). As Figure 2 makes clear, there is a strong relationship be-
tween the ideological predisposition of the Justices and the average
partisanship of their clerks; the Pearson's correlation between GOP
Percentage and Justice Liberalism is -0.59 (p < .001, N = 29).
61. See PEPPERS, supra note 5; Kenney, supra note 45.
62. See Distlear & Baum, supra note 45, at 870-75.
63. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 557, 557-65 (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideo-
logical Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 812-23
(1995) [hereinafter Ideological Values Revisited].
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Beyond judicial ideology, a number of other factors might influence
clerk partisanship. In the general population, partisanship is corre-
lated with both race and gender; nonwhites and women are more
likely, all else equal, to identify as Democrats than are white males.65
Therefore, we include naturally-coded indicator variables for Female
and White clerks. In addition, we include indicators for whether each
clerk in our data attended a Top-Five Law School,66 and whether or
not the clerk served on a Lower Court before coming to the Supreme
Court. Finally, we include a variable for the Term in which each clerk
served-coded as (Year of Service - 1900)-as a rudimentary control
for temporal changes in partisan affiliations over time.
We also include our partisanship variables in our model of survey
response, although we have no strong expectations for the influence of
64. Figure 2 plots the percentage of clerks identifying with the Republican Party, by Justices'
liberalism (Segal-Cover) scores. Symbol sizes are proportional to the numbers of clerks in the
data for that Justice.
65. The same could be said for a number of other demographic characteristics, including edu-
cation and occupation. With the exceptions of race and gender, however, Supreme Court clerks
constitute a relatively homogenous group on these other variables.
66. As in Figure 1, we operationalize "Top-Five" strictly in terms of the five schools that have
historically provided the Court with the greatest number of clerks: those schools are Harvard.






Justice Liberalism on response rates. Further, we do not expect that
race, gender, or legal education will influence response rates of former
clerks. To the extent that clerks with lower court clerkships may have
a greater investment in the clerkship institution, we harbor a slight
expectation that those clerks might be more likely to respond than
those with no lower court clerking experience. Our main expectation
vis-A-vis the surveys, however, is largely temporal. On the one hand,
we expect that clerks who served very recently will be less likely to
respond to our questionnaire, due to both their ongoing duty of confi-
dentiality to sitting Justices and decorum. On the other hand, we also
observed declining response rates as the term during which those
clerks served recedes into the past and the pool of possible respon-
dents is reduced through illness and death. Accordingly, we include
both linear and quadratic functions of our Term variable, with the ex-
pectation that our highest response rates will be from middle-aged
clerks.
Table 2 presents the results of our analysis of both survey response
and clerk partisanship. Columns two and three present simple probit
models of survey responses and partisanship, respectively, while col-
umns four and five present the results from the integrated (sample
selection) model. While several results are noteworthy, none is more
striking than this: the single most important influence on law clerk
partisanship is the ideological profile of the Justice for whom they
work. To a far greater extent than the other variables in the model,
the effect of Judicial Liberalism is to decrease the odds of a Justice
choosing a clerk from the Republican Party. This effect is seen most
starkly in Figure 3, which plots the predicted probabilities, along with
their ninety-five percent confidence intervals of a "median" clerk 67
identifying with the Republican Party, as a function of the Liberalism
score of the Justice for whom he clerks. Those predicted probabilities
decline from a high of 0.51 for a Justice with a Liberalism score of zero
(e.g., Justice Antonin Scalia) to a low of 0.12 for a Justice whose Lib-
eralism equals one (e.g., Justice Thurgood Marshall). 68
Supreme Court Justices' policy preferences, then, play a key role-
arguably, the key role-in the ideological makeup of the clerks in
their chambers. While ideological compatibility has long been specu-
67. That is, a white, male lower court clerk with a "top-five" law degree serving during the
Court's 1982 Term.
68. Interestingly, we find no evidence of a change in the degree of Justice-clerk ideological
convergence over time; the estimated effect of an interaction term for Justice Liberalism x Court
Term fails to achieve statistical or substantive significance in any of the models in Table 2. Con-
tra Distlear & Baum, supra note 45, at 875.
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lated to play a role in the clerk selection process, our findings are the
first direct evidence of such a relationship. Moreover, in light of the
fact that modern law clerks apply for positions in the chambers of all
nine Justices at once (thus ruling out possible self-selection effects),
these findings undercut the Justices' claims that they do not use ideol-
ogy as a selection criterion.69
TABLE 2: DETERMINANTS OF SURVEY RESPONSE AND CLERK
PARTISANSHIP, 1940-2004
Survey Selection Model
Variable Response Partisanship Response Partisanship
(Constant) 0.19 -0.13 0.26 -0.14
(1.44) (0.73) (1.45) (0.72)
Justice Liberalism 0.31* -1.22" 0.25 -1.22*
(0.12) (0.45) (0.17) (0.52)
Female Clerk -0.13 -0.41" -0.07 -0.41
(0.10) (0.23) (0.12) (0.29)
White Clerk 0.06 -0.31 0.21 -0.32
(0.16) (0.34) (0.17) (0.42)
Top-Five Law School -0.16" 0.07 -0.17* 0.08
(0.07) (0.14) (0.09) (0.26)
Lower Court Clerk 0.16 -0.15 0.30* -0.16
(0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.32)
Court Term 0.02 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.04) (0.008) (0.038) (0.024)
Court Term Squared -0.0003 - -0.0002 -
(0.0002) (0.0002)
p - - -0.03
(1.55)
Valid N (clerks) 1,026 391 1,026
In Table 2, survey response is coded one for clerks who indicated
their political party on the survey and zero for those for which no
information is available. Clerk partisanship is coded one for Republi-
can clerks and zero for Democrats. Cell entries are estimated probit
coefficients; robust standard errors, grouped by Justice, are in paren-
theses. Asterisks indicate p < .05 (one-tailed).
Beyond the influence of ideology, the results in Table 2 reveal a
number of interesting dynamics about the partisan identification of
Supreme Court clerks. For example, as expected, female clerks on
69. In part, these statements have been made to the author in off-the-record interviews with
two Supreme Court Justices and their law clerks. Moreover, the Justices themselves have occa-
sionally spoken publically about the selection process and denied the use of ideological litmus
tests, although the Justices have conceded that they will not hire law clerks with wildly differing
viewpoints. PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 31-36, 197, 200: see also WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 5,
at 99-107.
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average are less likely to identify with the GOP than are males. We
cannot ascertain, however, whether this is due to general demographic
differences in party identification across gender or due to selection
effects. At the same time, we find no evidence of differences in parti-
sanship across our categories for race, legal education, or lower court
service, nor do our results point to any broad trends over time in the
party identification of clerks.
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Figure 3 plots the predicted probability of a clerk identifying with
the Republican party as a function of Justice liberalism, holding other
variables constant at their means/medians. Bars are ninety-five per-
cent pointwise confidence intervals.
With respect to the survey response, we uncover significant negative
effects for graduation from a Top-Five Law School and significant
positive effects for Lower Court clerkships in the selection model. In
addition, we uncover the expected curvilinear effects of Term: both
2008]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
very recent clerks and elderly former clerks are less likely to respond
to our survey instrument than clerks from the intervening years. 70
Beyond their intrinsic interest, the results from our analyses of sur-
vey response and clerk partisanship offer a number of valuable in-
sights about our clerk-level ideology data. For purposes of our
research, the most valuable of these is the fact that the model in col-
umns four and five of Table 2 suggests that there is little or no sample
selection bias introduced by non-response to our clerkship survey.
The estimate for p is both small and statistically insignificant, and a
Wald test 71 conclusively fails to reject the null hypothesis that the er-
rors in the two equations are uncorrelated (X2(1) < 0.01, p = 0.98).
That fact, combined with the relative similarity of the results across
the two partisanship equations, 72 is strong evidence that our sample of
respondents is in fact representative of all clerks in the data. This, in
turn, suggests that we can use the results from our model of partisan-
ship to accurately infer the ideological leanings of those clerks for
whom we lack survey data.
C. Measures of Clerk Partisanship
With these results in hand, we consider three aggregate measures of
clerk partisanship. The first, which we label Reported Partisanship, is
based only on data for those individuals who responded in our survey.
That is, we aggregate the partisanship (coded one for Republicans and
zero for Democrats) of the clerks on whom we have data within terms
for each Justice, and use the mean of that aggregate as our indicator of
clerk ideology for that Justice's chambers in that year. While this
measure has the advantage of being the most direct indicator of clerk
partisanship, it also suffers from the greatest quantity of missing data.
Moreover, to the extent that the Reported Partnership measure is
based upon fewer clerks than the others, it also likely possesses the
greatest amount of measurement error.
For our second alternative indicator of clerk ideology, we use in-
stead the Predicted Values from the probit model of partisanship
presented in Table 2. We use the model in Table 2 to predict the parti-
70. Note that while the estimates themselves are not statistically significant, their joint effects
are substantial; for example, a test of whether Term and Term Squared are jointly equal to zero
conclusively rejects that hypothesis (X2(2) = 38.6 and 38.3, both p < 0.001, for the models in
columns two and four, respectively).
71. See generally Abraham Wald, Tests of Statistical Hypotheses Concerning Several Parame-
ters When the Number of Observations is Large, 54 TRANSACTIONS AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC*Y
426 (1943).
72. For example, the predicted values of Pr(GOP) from the probit model in column three and
those from the selection model (column five) correlate at 0.99.
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sanship-formally, the predicted probability that a given clerk is a Re-
publican-of each clerk, and then aggregate these predicted
probabilities. This approach allows us to generate out-of-sample pre-
dictions for clerks on whom we do not have survey data, which we
then aggregate to form our Justice-term specific measure of clerk ide-
ology. To the extent that, as the results in Table 2 demonstrate, those
clerks responding to our survey are not substantially different from
those who do not, this approach will yield predictions which accu-
rately reflect the partisan makeup of each Justices' clerks in each
term, while minimizing data loss due to missing information on clerk
partisanship.
Our final-and preferred-measure of clerk partisanship is a Com-
bined Measure that utilizes both observed and predicted values in our
aggregation. For this measure, we use actual partisanship for those
clerks on whom we have those data, and predicted values (again based
on the results in Table 2) for those on whom we do not. This approach
thus maximizes the information available by using actual data where
they are available and predictions where they are not.
TABLE 3: HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATION OF CLERK
PARTISANSHIP MEASURES
Reported Predicted Combined
Predicted Partisanship Values Measure
Clerk Respond? GOP Pr(GOP) Score Score Score
1 Yes 1 0.70
2 No ? 0.40 0.50 0.525 0.5375
3 Yes 0 0.25
4 No ? 0.75
Using each of the means of calculating the measure, Table 3 illus-
trates the aggregate (Justice-term) measures of clerk partisanship for
the hypothetical example data.
To illustrate the differences among these three measures, we pre-
sent data on a hypothetical Justice's clerks in Table 3. In our example,
two of the Justice's four clerks in that term (clerks I and 3) responded
to our survey; clerk one indicated she was a Republican, while clerk
three indicated he was a Democrat. The Reported Partisanship mea-
sure takes the simple average of these two responses and assigns a
value of (1 + 0)/2 = 0.50 for clerk partisanship in that term. Column
four of Table 3 reports the predicted Pr(GOP) for each of the four
clerks; note that these predictions are available both for the two clerks
that responded to the survey, as well as for those that did not. The
2008]
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Predicted Values measure calculates partisanship as the mean of these
scores, assigning a value of (0.70 + 0.40 + 0.25 + 0.75)/4 = 0.525 for
clerk partisanship in that term. Finally, the Combined Measure uses
information from both columns three and four of Table 3 and calcu-
lates partisanship as (1.00 + 0.40 + 0.00 + 0.75)/4 = 0.5375. While we
believe the last of these measures provides the best balance of data
coverage and information use, we report our findings using all three
measures in the discussion below. 73
IV. LAW CLERK INFLUENCE ON SUPREME COURT VOTING
Our central goal is to assess the degree of influence, if any, of law
clerks' ideological predispositions on the behavior of Supreme Court
Justices. We focus on the most extreme type of substantive influence:
how the Justices vote in cases before the Supreme Court. Arguably,
the Justices' votes are the aspect of decision making most insulated
from clerk influence; Justices have clearly defined preferences over
both law and policy, and scholars have documented that those prefer-
ences exert substantial influence over their votes on the merits.
74
Moreover, voting on the merits of particular cases remains the one
area in which commentators have not raised concerns of influence.75
By limiting the scope of our analysis to those votes, we effectively
"stack the deck" against finding evidence of clerk influence. If our
analyses demonstrate that law clerks exert even marginal influence on
how the Justices vote in cases before the Court, then such a finding
suggests that the independent power wielded by clerks pervades all
aspects of the Justices' judicial responsibilities.
Our analysis draws on data from the United States Supreme Court
Judicial Database.76 Specifically, we consider the votes of the Justices
73. Ditslear & Baum, supra note 45, adopt a similar multi-measure approach in their assess-
ment of the ideological positions of "feeder" court judges. Note that we employ the Combined
Measure as our indicator of clerk partisanship in Figure 1.
74. See, e.g., Segal & Cover, supra note 63, at 557-65; Ideological Values Revisited, supra note
63, at 812-23.
75. Conversely, many Court observers have pointed to the review of certiorari petitions as the
one area where law clerks most influence judicial behavior. See, e.g., WOODWARD & ARM-
STRONG, supra note 11. However, Lazarus suggests that "[tlhe danger of clerk bias and the
potential for real mischief was much more intense and dramatic in the emergency death penalty
stays." LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 268. We hope to next examine the impact of law clerk ideol-
ogy on the review of cert petitions.
76. See HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE,
1953-2005 TERMS (2006), available at http://facweb.knowlton.ohio-state.edu/pvitonlsupport/
codebook-c.html.
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in all cases decided during the 1953-2005 terms of the Court,7 7 coded
one for votes in favor of an ideologically liberal outcome and zero for
a vote in favor of a conservative outcome.78 Our model of Supreme
Court voting is a relatively simple one:
Pr(Liberal Vote) = f [3o + 31(Justice Liberalism) + F2(Clerk Partisan-
ship) + X3 + u] (1)
where Clerk Partisanship takes on one of the three forms described
above, and X3 is a set of control variables. In the analyses below, XP3
consists of a set of indicator variables for the issue area addressed in
the case to control for the propensity of Justices to rule more liberally
in some issue areas than others. 79
In this context, the measurement of Justice Liberalism poses a par-
ticular challenge. The Segal-Cover scores provide a static measure of
each Justice's liberalism, measured at the beginning of their Court ten-
ure.80 If, as some scholars have noted,81 Justices' ideological prefer-
ences change over their careers-and if, as we have established, those
preferences influence their choice of clerks-then such a measure
runs the risk of confounding our ability to uncover clerk influence. 82
At the same time, widely used dynamic measures of the Justice's pol-
icy preferences, such as those of Martin and Quinn,83 are based on the
Justices' votes, and therefore raise the specter of endogeneity. 84
77. Our unit of analysis is the docket number (analu < 2); we treat nonparticipations, judg-
ments of the court, dissents from denial of cert, and jurisdictional dissents as missing. Moreover,
we consider only formally decided cases (dec-type = 1 or 6). Our results are substantively
unchanged if we broaden the analysis to include cases decided per curiam and memorandum
cases.
78. Our coding corresponds to Spaeth's dir variable; for details, see SPAETH, supra note 76.
79. Formally, we include fixed effects for each of the twelve broad issue areas described by
Spaeth's value variable. See SPAETH, supra note 76. Our conclusions are substantively identical
if we estimate either fixed- or random-effects models with separate unit effects for each case;
those results are available from the authors upon request.
80. See Segal & Cover, supra note 63.
81. See Lee Epstein, Valerie Hoekstra, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Do Political Pref-
erences Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801, 801-18
(1998); Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological Drift
Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483
(2007).
82. For example, if a Justice becomes more liberal over time, then he or she would likely both
vote more liberally and select more liberal clerks later in his or her career. A static measure of
Justice Liberalism would then fail to "pick up" the change in the Justice's ideology, while the
measure of clerk partisanship would do so, potentially leading the analyst to uncover apparent
clerk influence even if none was present.
83. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 134-53
(2002).
84. This potential for endogeneity is why, in the models of clerk selection above, we use only
the Segal-Cover measures of Justice Liberalism.
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Because each measurement approach has strengths and weak-
nesses, we consider both sets of measures. We estimate one set of
models in which Justice Liberalism is measured using the (static, exog-
enous) Segal-Cover scores, and a second set using the (dynamic, en-
dogenous) Martin-Quinn measure. In addition, as a check on the
robustness of our results, we also estimate an alternative set of models
in which we include Justice-specific fixed effects. This approach al-
lows us to independently estimate each Justice's propensity to vote
liberally and so offers the maximum possible assurance that the model
correctly controls for the influence of the Justices' policy preferences
on the vote. Given the operationalization of Clerk Partisanship, a
finding of P2 < 0 is evidence that, over and above the influence of
judicial ideology, the political partisanship of a Justice's clerks exerts
an independent influence on his or her decisions.
Table 4 reports the results of nine logit models of the influence of
Justice and clerk ideology on Supreme Court voting.85 For the six
models that include a measure of Justice Liberalism, all support the
general proposition that, ceteris paribus, more liberal Justices are
more likely to vote for liberal outcomes than their conservative coun-
terparts. More striking is the consistent influence of Clerk Partisan-
ship; in all nine models, the sign of the estimated effect is in the
expected direction, and in seven of the nine, that estimate is statisti-
cally differentiable from zero at the p - 0.05 level or greater (one-
tailed).86 The strongest and most consistent effects are for our Com-
bined Measure of Clerk Partisanship. In the model including the Se-
gal-Cover measure of Justice Liberalism, the expected effect of a one-
unit change in this variable-from homogenously Democratic clerks
to homogenously Republican ones-is to decrease the odds of a lib-
eral vote by forty percent. While somewhat more attenuated, law
clerk partisanship retains its explanatory power in the models using
the Martin-Quinn measure of Justice Liberalism, and those containing
85. In Table 4, columns denote variables, while rows denote the combination of Justice Liber-
alism and Clerk Partisanship measures used in each analysis. Including the multiplicative inter-
action of Justice Liberalism and Clerk Partisanship in the models yields results substantively
identical to those presented here, indicating that it is neither liberal nor conservative Justices
that demonstrate greater effects of clerk ideology on their voting. Likewise, inclusion of an
interaction term between Clerk Partisanship and a counter for the term of the Court (with
OT1953=1) yielded estimates that were not statistically differentiable from zero; this suggests
that, at least against the alternative of monotonically increasing or decreasing clerk influence,
the effect of clerk ideology has remained relatively stable over the past fifty years.
86. Moreover, in the fixed-effects model using the Predicted Values operationalization of clerk
partisanship, the estimate is significant at p = 0.06 (one-tailed).
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Justice-specific fixed effects, as well, which indicates that clerk influ-
ence is robust to varying specifications of judicial ideology.87
TABLE 4: CLERK PARTISANSHIP AND JUSTICES' VOTES
Justice Clerk
(Constant) Liberalism Partisanship Valid N
Segal-Cover Measure
Reported Partisanship -0.65 1.32' -0.41' 39,711
(0.21) (0.24) (0.12)
Predicted Values -0.30 1.01' -0.99 43,800
(0.66) (0.56) (1.24)
Combined Measure -0.53 1.19' -0.51' 53,246
(0.24) (0.26) (0.17)
Martin-Quinn Measure
Reported Partisanship -0.09 0.30* -0.14' 39,708
(0.11) (0.03) (0.05)
Predicted Values 0.27 0.27* -1.26' 43,798
(0.16) (0.03) (0.31)
Combined Measure -0.03 0.29* -0.29* 53,243
(0.11) (0.03) (0.09)
Fixed Effects
Reported Partisanship n/a n/a -0.18' 39,711
(0.05)
Predicted Values n/a n/a -1.46 43,800
(0.91)
Combined Measure n/a n/a -0.25' 53,246
(0.08)
In Table 4, the response variable is the ideological direction of the
Justices' votes, coded one for liberal votes and zero for conservative.
Cell entries are estimated logit coefficients; robust standard errors,
grouped by Justice, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate p < .05
(one-tailed). All models include fixed effects for issue areas (not re-
ported), and "fixed-effects" models also include twenty-nine fixed ef-
fects for Justices.
Figure 4 presents a clearer picture of the relative magnitude of the
effect of clerk partisanship, plotting predicted probabilities of a liberal
vote as a function of the two main covariates of interest: Justice Liber-
alism (measured using the Segal-Cover indicator) and Clerk Partisan-
ship. Note that both variables' values range from a low of zero to a
high of one; for purposes of comparability, we rescale the Clerk Parti-
sanship variable so that higher values denote greater liberalism-that
87. In addition, to the extent that Clerk Partisanship is itself a function of Justice Liberalism,
the inclusion of both in the model of votes should work to attenuate the impact of the former.
Thus, our results are, if anything, somewhat more conservative than they might otherwise be,
absent this variable's inclusion.
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is, higher levels of adherence to the Democratic party.88 Points (cir-
cles and triangles) denote point predictions, while bars indicate
ninety-five percent pointwise confidence intervals around those
predictions.
FIGURE 4: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF A LIBERAL VOTE BY
JUSTICE/CLERK IDEOLOGY
0IN
0 .2 .4 .6 .81
Justice I Clerk Liberalism
Figure 4 plots the predicted probability of a liberal vote, as a func-
tion of clerk (circles) and Justice (triangles) liberalism, holding other
variables constant at their means. Bars are ninety-five percent
pointwise confidence intervals.
The predictions in Figure 4 illustrate that the marginal impact of
Clerk Ideology is between one-third and one-half that of Justice Liber-
alism. While a change across the full range of Clerk Partisanship from
an all-Republican cadre of clerks to one composed entirely of Demo-
88. Predictions are from the model in row three of Table 4; that is, they use the Combined
Measure of Clerk Partisanship. In both instances, the values of the other variables in the model
are held at their mean or median values. Thus, the predictions for Clerk Partisanship are for a
Justice with a Liberalism score of 0.50, while the predictions for Justice Liberalism are for a
Justice with a Clerk Partisanship score of 0.29 (that is, with roughly thirty percent of his or her
clerks identifying with the Republican Party). We also set all issue-specific dummy variables to




crats increases the predicted probability of a liberal vote by 0.13 (from
0.39 to 0.52), the same shift in Justice Liberalism yields a correspond-
ing probability increase of 0.28 (from 0.34 to 0.62). Moreover, the
confidence intervals indicate that the magnitude of this shift is suffi-
cient to preclude the possibility of its being a statistical artifact at a
high degree of confidence. The evidence, then, supports the proposi-
tion that, over and above the influence of the Justices' own policy
preferences, their clerks' policy preferences have an independent ef-
fect on their votes.
V. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
While our findings with respect to clerk influence are compelling, it
is important to highlight a number of limitations on those findings.
First, our model of judicial decision making is relatively simple. While
our analyses control in a straightforward and flexible way for differ-
ences across both cases and Justices, a more thorough analysis might
explicitly include the influence of factors such as case facts,89 changes
in legal regimes,90 and other mediating influences on the Justices'
votes. To do so, however, would necessarily limit the analysis to a
particular area of the law and require that we sacrifice generalizability
for improved specification. We leave such an analysis for future work,
while recognizing the potential value of such an approach.
Second, the implications of our results are somewhat limited by our
methodological approach. While we demonstrate a clear correlation
between clerk partisanship and the Justices' voting-one that persists
in the face of even strong controls for the ideology of the Justice-it is
important to underscore that our findings offer no support for any
particular causal model of that influence. As discussed above, the
mechanisms by which clerks might influence their Justices' behavior
are many and varied; cert memoranda, bench memoranda, and infor-
mal conversations are all possible avenues through which law clerks
can express their policy preferences. Moreover, to shape their Jus-
tices' perception of a case, law clerks might wield both appropriate
methods, such as engaging in candid and open policy debates, as well
as inappropriate methods, such as deception in memoranda writing.
Therefore, unpacking the precise means by which law clerks exert in-
fluence over judicial decision making remains a task for future
research.
89. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and
Seizure Cases, 1962-1981, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 891 (1984); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 13.
90. See Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court
Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 305, 305-20 (2002).
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Third, our discussion is necessarily limited to the clerks' influence
on how Justices vote on cases before the Court for final disposition.
As we stated at the outset, voting and case outcomes are less likely
loci of clerk influence on the Justices. Both existing scholarly research
and journalistic accounts of the Court's internal operations suggest
that other phenomena-including the certiorari process, discretionary
opinion writing, and opinion content-are likely more susceptible to
the influence of law clerks than voting on the merits of a case. 91
Despite these caveats, we believe our findings are remarkable in a
number of respects. For example, we provide the first direct evidence
of "selection effects" in clerk hiring. Our robust finding that Justices
choose clerks with an eye to their ideological convictions confirms
both widespread popular speculation and findings from previous, indi-
rect empirical studies. In addition to bolstering the argument for clerk
influence, that finding also holds implications for questions of clerk
selection and identity. For example, an ongoing question in the popu-
lar press has been the level of diversity among Supreme Court
clerks.92 An important corollary of this concern is whether and to
what extent law clerk diversity alters the way the Justices view the
issues before them. As noted above, the number of female clerks has
increased precipitously during the past three decades, while the num-
ber of African American law clerks has both grown more slowly and
has varied dramatically by Justice. Whether such representation af-
fects, at the margin, Justices' decisions in cases involving racial dis-
crimination, gender discrimination, or both is a question we plan to
address in future work.
Similarly, while scholars and commentators have persistently
claimed that law clerks wield excessive influence over Supreme Court
operations, those allegations have not yet been subjected to empirical
verification.93 These charges have given rise to a number of proposals
by Court outsiders to limit what they characterize as undue influence
by the clerks on the Supreme Court's decision making, 94 but their pro-
ponents' inability to offer an empirical assessment of the nature,
91. Accordingly, we plan to investigate these alternatives in future work, paying special atten-
tion to the differences in the manner in which the Justices utilized their clerks, both across cham-
bers and over time.
92. See Joan Biskupic, Two Justices Defend Lack of Minority Court Clerks, WASH. POST, Mar.
16, 2000, at A23; Michael A. Fletcher, As Term Opens, Lack Of Diversity is Decried, WASH.
POST, Oct. 6, 1998, at A3; Mauro, supra note 2.
93. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
94. For example, then-Senator John Stennis once suggested that Congress should establish




scope, and seriousness of law clerk influence has lessened the effec-
tiveness of those calls. 95
Our findings strongly suggest that the partisan composition of a Jus-
tice's clerks can and does influence that Justice's decision making.
Those findings are robust to the approach we use to operationalize
clerk and Justice ideology, and are relatively consistent both across
Justices of different ideological views and over time. Substantively,
while the size of our "clerk effect" is relatively modest, we nonethe-
less conclude that law clerks' ideology exercises a separate and inde-
pendent influence over how the Justices vote on the merits of cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our findings suggest that social scientists and other scholars should
no longer quickly dismiss the role of law clerks in judicial decision
making. However, this result signifies a beginning, rather than an end,
of inquiry into the topic. To date, the widespread public discussion of
law clerk influence has lacked a careful analysis of the different types
of influence and the multiple paths through which that influence can
be exercised. Simultaneously, that dialogue has suffered from Court
observers' failure to appreciate that law clerks are not autonomous
political actors. From the first day of the clerkship, the law clerk is
bound by formal and informal institutional rules and norms imposed
by the Supreme Court, as well as the individual Justices. Observers
must clearly understand the interplay of those rules, norms, and pref-
erences before reaching a final verdict on the extent or desirability of
clerk influence.
95. However, there is evidence that the Justices themselves have taken the allegations of law
clerk influence seriously and have implemented some institutional changes designed to minimize
such influence. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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